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NOTE

MARITIME LAW-COMMON SENSE AND NONSENSE
STAND FACE TO FACE IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT-Hassingerv. Tideland Electric Membership Corp.
INTRODUCTION

In Hassinger v. Tideland Electric Membership Corp.,1 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit took a small
yet significant step in its development of maritime2 law. The court
held that a pleasure vessel owner can invoke the federal courts'
maritime jurisdiction in a personal injury tort claim if the claim
bears a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity and
occurs within the boundary of navigable waters, regardless of
whether the tort was actually consummated in the water. The decision represents a common sense approach to handling a problem in
a field of law where common sense solutions are at times lacking.
This Note analyzes the Hassinger opinion in two sections. After a discussion of the case and the background of maritime jurisdiction, the first section considers the inappropriate use of a dis1. 781 F.2d 1022 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, - U.S.
(1986).

_,

106 S. Ct. 3294

2. This Note uses the term "maritime" to denote a claim that could be
brought in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. IV 1980), 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1976) and 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976). This Note uses the term "admiralty" to denote a maritime claim that can only be brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976).
The distinction between the two terms arises because many claims cognizable in
admiralty under 28 U.S.C. § 1333 can be brought in non-admiralty courts. Thus,
every admiralty claim is a maritime claim, but not every maritime claim is an
admiralty claim. A comprehensive enumeration of those claims that are "maritime" is beyond the scope of this Note. Examples of those claims cognizable exclusively within the federal courts' section 1333 admiralty provision include: Suits
in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-52 (1976), Death on the High Seas Act, 46
U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1976), Public Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-90 (1976), Ship
Mortgage Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 911-84 (1976). In addition, petitions under the Limitation of Shipowner's Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-96 (1976), are filed in admiralty. See Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104, 123-24 (1871) (court held
that petitions authorized under § 185 are filed in admiralty).
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trict court case cited for support in Hassinger The second section
considers the anomalous jurisdictional results created for pleasure
vessel owners who use boat launching ramps when the Hassinger
holding is combined with the holding of Hastings v. Mann,4 another Fourth Circuit opinion written twenty-two years ago.
THE CASE

In the early afternoon of June 5, 1982, Charles Hassinger, Stuart Powell, and Robert Proctor were electrocuted while beaching
Hassinger's eighteen-foot Hobie Cat 5 sailboat when the boat's mast
contacted an overhead, "energized, uninsulated power line carrying
7,200 volts of electricity." 6 Earlier that morning the three men and
a companion, Rex King, had been sailing across Pamlico Sound to
Silver Lake7 in two Hobie Cat sailboats. Upon reaching what appeared to be a suitable spot on the shoreline of Silver Lake to
beach the boats, it was decided that Hassinger's boat would be pulled ashore first, while Powell's boat remained in the water. While
beaching Hassinger's boat, the tragic electrocutions occurred.'
Administrators for the three decedents' estates brought federal wrongful death suits9 against three parties-Tideland Electric
3. The case cited by the Hassinger court is Blanchard v. American Commercial Barge Line Co., 343 F. Supp. 920 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 468 F.2d 950 (5th Cir.
1972).
4. 340 F.2d 910 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 963 (1965).
5. The origin of the Hobie Cat sailboat design "started with an idea and a
sand drawing. During a conversation after surfing one California morning, Hobie
Alter discussed the first Hobie Cat with a friend while sketching his original design with a stick in wet sand. The result. . .[was] a lightweight high speed...
catamaran that could be rigged, sailed, and righted from a capsize by a single
person .

. . ."

HomE CAT "14" SALEs BROCHURE: 1981.

6. Hassinger, 781 F.2d at 1024.
7. "Silver Lake is a navigable body of water located in Hyde County encompassed by Okracoke, North Carolina. The waters of Silver Lake are tidal waters,
subject to the ebb and flow of the tide; in addition, its waters are used for commercial purposes by ferry boats and fishing boats." Hassinger v. Tideland Electric
Membership Corp., 627 F. Supp. 65, 68 n.2 (E.D.N.C. 1985).
8. "It is unclear whether all four men participated in pulling the Hassinger
boat ashore, or whether Proctor, Hassinger and King were in the process of
beaching the boat when the mast struck the power line, and Powell attempted to
rescue his companions." Hassinger, 627 F. Supp. at 68 n.3.
9. In 1886, in The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886), the Supreme Court held
that general maritime law afforded no remedy for wrongful death in the absence
of an applicable state or federal statute. This rule controlled until 1970, when the
Supreme Court held in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970),
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Membership Corporation (Tideland), the owner and operator of
the power line, Coast Catamaran Corporation (Coast),10 the designer, manufacturer and distributor of the Hobie Cat sailboat involved, and Coleman Company Incorporated (Coleman)," the parent corporation of Coast. Plaintiffs asserted federal maritime
jurisdiction over Tideland pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 133312 and
46 U.S.C. section 740,11 and federal question jurisdiction pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. section 1331.14 Plaintiffs also asserted federal marithat a federal cause of action did exist under general maritime law for wrongful
deaths occurring within territorial waters.
10. According to a Hobie Cat sales representative at Wrightsville Beach,
North Carolina, many of the future models of this sailboat will feature fiberglass
mast-tips to reduce the electrical conductivity of the mast. The sales brochure for
the Hobie Cat "17", however, explains the purpose of this new fiberglass mast-tip
from a different perspective. The brochure states that "[wihile three-quarters of
the mast is aluminum, the top 81/2-foot section is beautifully tapered and constructed of composite fiberglass materials. Being much more flexible than aluminum, the fiberglass tip allows a wider range of adjustment and control of sail
shape. The taper reduces aerodynamic drag and allows a cleaner, more efficient
air flow onto the sail." HOmE CAT "17" SALEs BROCHURE: 1985.
11. Coleman was an original defendant in this lawsuit, so named because it,
along with its wholly-owned subsidiary, Coast Catamaran, allegedly designed,
manufactured and sold the Hobie Cat sailboat involved in the accident. By order
dated October 30, 1985, and published at 622 F. Supp. 146 (E.D.N.C. 1985), the
district court granted Coleman's motion for summary judgment, holding that
plaintiffs had failed to show the requisite degree of control and circumstances of
fraud required under North Carolina's "alter ego" or "instrumentality" doctrine
to hold Coleman accountable. Id. at 151-52.
12. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the
courts of the States, of:
(1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in
all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled .... " 28 U.S.C. §
1333 (1976).
13. "The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States shall extend to and include all cases of damage or injury, to person or property, caused by
a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding that such damage or injury be done
or consummated on land . . . ." 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1976).
The district court found that because jurisdiction was present under 28
U.S.C. § 1333 regarding all the defendants, it was not necessary to address
whether jurisdiction also existed under the Admiralty Jurisdiction Extension Act.
Hassinger, 627 F. Supp. at 72 n.11.
14. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. §
1331 (1980).
Plaintiffs attempted to assert an independent federal jurisdictional basis
against Tideland by alleging violations of two federal statutes-specifically, 33
U.S.C. § 403 and 14 U.S.C. § 85. Hassinger, 627 F. Supp. at 72. Tideland's motion
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time jurisdiction over Coast and Coleman pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
section 1333 and 46 U.S.C. section 740, and federal diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1332.11
Defendants moved in the district court to dismiss all of the
maritime jurisdiction claims, alleging that the sailboat was out of
the water when the accident occurred,' and therefore no maritime
locality, or situs, existed. Defendants also maintained that there
was no significant relationship to traditional maritime activity, or
nexus, present.
The district court denied the defendants' motion, holding that
for purposes of maritime jurisdiction, the navigable waters in tidal
areas extend to the mean high water mark (MHW-Mark), even
when the tide is below this line. Because the sailboat was below the
MHW-Mark when the accident occurred, the situs for maritime jurisdiction was present. 17 Furthermore, the court found that the activity of the decedents in beaching the sailboat bore a significant
relationship to traditional maritime activity; therefore the nexus
for maritime jurisdiction was also present.' 8 The Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the
situs and nexus requirements for maritime jurisdiction were satisfied.1 9 A jury trial on all issues was then conducted during early
1986, with plaintiffs recovering $843,190 for the deaths of the three
decedents 2 0
to dismiss these claims, however, was granted by the district court in its order
dated April 18, 1985, on the basis that neither statute created a private enforcement mechanism-both statutes were found to be enforceable only by the federal
government in its efforts to respond to obstructions on navigable waters. Hassinger, 627 F. Supp. at 73.
15. The diversity statute reads, in part:
"(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of
interest and costs, and is between(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a state and citizens or subjects of a foreign state ...

" 28

U.S.C. § 1332 (1982).
16. The court noted that evidence stating that the sailboat was at least partially in the water when the accident occurred was confirmed by at least sixteen
witnesses; whereas, evidence stating that the sailboat was not in the water, but on
dry ground, was confirmed by at least four witnesses. Hassinger, 781 F.2d at 102425.
17. Hassinger, 627 F. Supp. at 71.
18. Id. at 72, 74.
19. 781 F.2d 1022 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 3294 (1986).
20. Prior to trial, the parties consented to the case being tried by a Magishttps://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol9/iss1/7
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BACKGROUND

A.

The Constitutionaland Statutory Basis for Maritime Claims

Though the precise origins of maritime legal principles are disputed, 21 its law "has evolved over many centuries, designed and
molded to handle problems of vessels relegated to ply the waterways of the world, beyond whose shores they cannot go." '22 The

maritime jurisdiction of the federal courts arose from the conviction of the Constitutional Convention's members that there was
need for a uniform body of laws, in general harmony with the laws
of other maritime nations, "to protect the domestic shipping industry in its competition with foreign shipping.

23

For the Conven-

tion members, thirteen bodies of law would be unacceptable for
governing the new nation's international trade. Those in the shipping industry needed uniform laws to give some type of predictability concerning their rights and liabilities.2
The constitutional authority for creating this uniform set of
rules was drafted in article III of the Constitution. 25 This article
enabled the federal courts to accept and adopt the maritime law of
other nations, thereby creating the uniformity needed to regulate
trate pursuant to Local Rule 62.08, Eastern District of North Carolina, Federal
Local Court Rules 93 (Callaghan 1986) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Accordingly, the
case was set on the trial calendar of Charles K. McCotter, Jr., U.S. Magistrate.
Administrators for the three decedents received cumulative damages in the
amount of $1,423,500, which was then offset by decedents' comparative negligence. The administrator for Hassinger received $183,975 ($334,500 total, offset
by 45 percent); the administrator for Proctor received $403,975 ($734,500 total,
offset by 45 percent); and the administrator for Powell received $255,240
($354,500 total, offset by 28 percent).
21. For a detailed account of what may be the ancient sources of the law of
admiralty, dating back to the times of Babylon and extending up to our current
legal maritime structure, see 1 E. BENEDICT, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY Ch. 1 (7th
ed. 1985) (hereinafter cited as BENEDICT). Contra G. GILMORE AND C. BLACK, JR.,
THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY (2d ed. 1975). ("Nothing like a formal sea-code has survived even from Greek or Roman antiquity; the few glimpses we get of the workings of what might today be called maritime law could at the most serve as bases
for reconstructions of doubtful validity." Id. at 3.)
22. Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 269-70
(1972).
23. Foremost Insurance Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 684 (1982) (quoting
Crosson v. Vance, 484 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1973)).
24. The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 566 (1874).
25. "The judicial Power shall extend. . . to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction . . . ." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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the shipping industry.2 6 The statutory authority giving the federal
courts exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases within the field of maritime law is now found in section 1333 of title 28.27 Section 1333's
"saving clause", 2 8 however, creates an exception for maritime
plaintiffs which allows them an important option. They are not required to bring in personam tort and contract claims under section
1333's admiralty provision. Rather, they can bring these claims in
the state courts, or in the federal courts as section 1332 diversity
claims.2 9
The principal advantage to "saving clause" plaintiffs for bringing personal injury claims outside of section 1333's admiralty provision is two-fold. First, the section 1332 diversity plaintiff suing in
federal court on a maritime claim has a right to a trial by jury,30
whereas the section 1333 admiralty plaintiff ordinarily has his case
tried by the court."1 Most plaintiffs undoubtedly seek jury trials
because they perceive juries to be more sympathetic to their plight
than the trial judge.32 Second, all substantive issues in maritime
26. The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 572-77 (1874) (drawing the analogy between adoption of maritime and common law). Furthermore, most maritime legislation falls within the commerce power as well, since maritime activities
are closely related to interstate and international trade.
27. See supra note 12.
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1). See supra note 12.
29. For more than a century, the early effect of the saving-to-suitors clause
was to permit state courts to hear maritime cases and to apply their own law,
which defeated the very purpose of the federal maritime grant. It was not until
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917) that the Supreme Court had
the opportunity to hold that maritime law displaces common law in non-maritime
courts whenever the two conflict. Id. at 216, 222-23.
30. See Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S.
355, 359-60 (1962) (seventh amendment protects the right to jury trial in saving
clause suits brought under the federal courts' diversity jurisdiction).
31. See Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963) (seventh
amendment does not require jury trial in admiralty).
32. Commenting on the jury's sturdy democratic virtues, Justice Hunt, in
Sioux City & Pac. R.R. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1873), stated:
Twelve men of the average of the community, comprising men of education and men of little education, men of learning and men whose learning
consists only in what they have themselves seen and heard, the
merchant, the mechanic, the farmer, the-laborer; these sit together, consult, apply their separate experience of the affairs of life to the facts
proven, and draw a unanimous conclusion. This average judgment thus
given it is the great effort of the law to obtain. It is assumed that twelve
men know more of the common affairs of life than does one man, that
they can draw wiser and safer conclusions from admitted facts thus ochttps://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol9/iss1/7
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cases are governed by federal maritime law, regardless of which forum the plaintiff chooses.33 This application of maritime law to
"saving clause" diversity claims brought under section 1332 is particularly important if the plaintiff was negligent, because the law of
comparative negligence will apply.34 In the North Carolina federal
courts this would be of central concern to a negligent plaintiff because under Erie principles, 5 if North Carolina law were held to
apply, contributory negligence could bar any possible recovery."
"Saving clause" plaintiffs and those plaintiffs bringing claims
under a federal statute, however, must still satisfy the requirements for federal civil jurisdiction. If brought under the section
1332 diversity provision, the controversy must involve citizens of
different states and the amount in controversy must exceed
$10,000.11 If brought under the section 1331 federal question provision, s the controversy must arise under a federal statute granting
civil jurisdiction. The constitutional authority to hear these cases
is also granted by article III of the Constitution.3 9 The statutory
authority for civil jurisdiction over diversity cases is found in section 1332 of title 28,40 and the statutory authority for federal questions cases in various other provisions of title 28.
One problem created by having these three jurisdictional
choices available occurs when maritime plaintiffs begin combining
the section 1331 (federal question), section 1332 (diversity) and
section 1333 (admiralty) causes of action together against diverse
and non-diverse defendants.4 ' In deciding who will be the
curring than can a single judge.
Id. at 664.
33. Regardless of the court in which the action is brought, the federal substantive admiralty or maritime law applies if the claim is one cognizable in admiralty. See Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355
(1962).
34. See The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1 (1890); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346
U.S. 406, 431 (1953).
35. See Chelentis v. Luckenback S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372, 384 (1918) (holding
that in the field of maritime law, a reverse-Erie approach is applicable).
36. See Smith v. Fiber Controls Corp., 300 N.C. 669, 268 S.E.2d 504 (1980).
37. See supra note 15.
38. See supra note 14.
39. "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law ... arising under
...the Laws of the United States; to Controversies between ... Citizens of different States." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
40. See supra note 15.
41. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 369
(1959).
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1986
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factfinder, the court is then forced to choose between ordering all
issues to be heard by the court,"2 separating the different issues
between the court and jury along jurisdictional lines, or ordering
all issues to be heard by the jury. 3 This possibility of bringing
combined actions resulted when the Supreme Court unified the
rules governing admiralty procedure with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in 1966."" Prior to this unification, there were separate admiralty and law dockets, and a district court sitting in admiralty could not hear a separate legal claim, nor could a court on
the law side hear a separate admiralty claim. 45 The district court
now has one docket and can hear any separate claim or combination of claims over which the court has jurisdiction. The Rules also
contain numerous provisions which accommodate bringing combined actions involving admiralty, diversity and federal question
claims. Analyzing the details of those provisions, however, is beyond the scope of this Note.4
B.

Navigable Waters and Tidal Boundaries

When Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1789, section 9 of
47
the Act conferred maritime jurisdiction upon the federal courts.
This jurisdiction drew its origins, however, from those pre-1789
maritime principles employed by the early English courts. Thus,
"'[tihe place absolutely subject to the jurisdiction of the admiraltie, is the sea, which seemeth to comprehend publick rivers, fresh
waters, creekes, and surrounded places whatsoever within the ebbing and flowing of the sea at the highest water.' ",41 One distin42. Powell v. Offshore Navigation, Inc., 644 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1981).
43. The district court in Hassinger, faced with such a predicament, held that
the claims presented were so interrelated that trial by a single factfinder was required; and further, that the "constitutionally protected right to a jury trial for
civil claims outweighs the tradition of non-jury trials in admiralty." Hassinger,
627 F. Supp. at 75-76.
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
45. See Currie, The Silver Oar and All That: A Study of the Romero Case,
27 U. Cm. L. REV. 1, 12, 28-40 (1959).
46. For a detailed listing of these changes, see 7A J. MOORE, A. PELAEZ,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 351-73 (1983). Examples of these provisions include
FED. R. Civ. P. 9(h), 14(e), 38(e), 39(c), 42 and 82. Id.
47. "[T]he district courts ... shall ... have exclusive original cognizance of
all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction ... saving to suitors, in all

cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to
give it .

. . ."

The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20 § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77.

48. The Blackheath, 195 U.S. 361, 366 (1904) (quoting
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol9/iss1/7
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guished commentator suggests that definitions such as these reflected the successful effort of the law courts in England to confine
the maritime jurisdiction. The result in this country was that colonial commissions and patents granting maritime jurisdiction contemplated all "places overflowed whatsoever, within the ebbing
49
and flowing of the sea, or high water mark.
The Supreme Court in the early 1800's found this definition of
the maritime jurisdiction acceptable for the country's needs. In
The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson,6 0 involving a claim for wages
earned on a round-trip voyage from Shippingport, Kentucky along
the Missouri River, the Court accepted the English definition by
holding that navigation on the Missouri River was not within the
maritime jurisdiction because that river was not tidal.51 The Court
also stated that "[wihether, under the power to regulate commerce
between the States, Congress may not extend the remedy, by the
summary process of the Admiralty, to the case of voyages on the
' 52
western waters, it is unnecessary for us to consider.
As the young nation began to move westward and settlements
along the Great Lakes and the major rivers prospered, a change in
the maritime jurisdiction was inevitable. By 1845 Congress had extended the maritime jurisdiction of the federal courts to the nontidal Great Lakes.5 3 It was in The PropellerGenesee Chief v. Fitzhugh,54 which involved a ship collision on Lake Ontario, that the
Supreme Court relied on section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 to
redefine the extent of the maritime jurisdiction. The Court held
that the maritime jurisdiction should not depend solely on whether
the waters were tidal; rather, the "navigable character of the
water" should be controlling.5 "If the water was navigable it was
deemed to be public; and if public. .. [it should be] regarded as
within the legitimate scope of the. . . [maritime] jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution. '" '
The Court's next step in defining the extent of maritime jurisdiction to our nation's navigable waters came in The Steamer
WORKS,

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

2d ed. at 226).
4 E. BENEDICT, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY 435 (6th ed. 1940).
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825).
Id. at 429.
Id. at 430.
Act of February 26, 1845, 5 Stat. 726 (1845).
53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851).
Id. at 457.
Id.
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Daniel Ball.57 The case involved a claim by the government to recover penalty fees from the steamship Daniel Ball for its failure to
acquire the necessary inspection and license required by the Act of
August 30, 1852.58 That Act required all steam-powered passenger
vessels operating on the "navigable waters of the United States" to
meet certain licensing requirements before operating for hire.5
The owners of the Daniel Ball asserted that she was engaged only
in carrying passengers between the cities of Grand Rapids and
Grand Haven, Michigan along the Grand River, and that the river
was not "navigable waters." The owners, therefore, argued that
they were not subject to the licensing requirements of the Act.60
The Court disagreed, stating that because
the ebb and flow of the tide do not constitute the usual test, as in
England, as to the navigability of waters . . . ,[a] different test
must, therefore, be applied to determine the navigability of our
rivers.. . . Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers . . . which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in
fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used ... as
highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may
be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on
water.0 '
The end result today of this evolution in defining the navigable waters is this: navigable waters include nontidal waters which
were navigable in the past or which could be made navigable in
fact by reasonable improvements, 2 and tidal waters within the ebb
and flow of the tide, with no showing of actual or potential navigability required.63 The maritime jurisdiction in tidal waters, however, has not been interpreted as meaning that the jurisdiction recedes with the low tide and expands with the high tide. Because
the range of the tide at any given place varies from day to day,6 '
57. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1871).
58. 10 Stat. 61 (1852).
59. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 566.
60. Id. at 559, 561.
61. Id. at 563.
62. Id. at 557.
63. Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 578 F.2d 742, 749 (9th Cir. 1978).
64. Every 24.8 hours, the Atlantic coast experiences two complete tidal cycles, each including a high and low tide. Because the difference between the two
daily tidal cycles, known as semi-diurnal tides, is relatively slight, in most instances there is little difference between the two high tides or between the two
low tides on a given day. Id. at 746.
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol9/iss1/7
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the MHW-Mark has traditionally been the limit of maritime jurisdiction in tidal waters.60 The Supreme Court repeated this ruling
on the boundary of navigable waters in tidal areas in Willink v.
United States,6 an eminent domain case involving a wharf owner
whose property bordered on the Savannah River.67 The Court
ruled that the plaintiff was not entitled to compensation for any
damage to his marine railway that was below the MHW-Mark and
within the Savannah harbor lines." The Court held that because
the Savannah River was "navigable and tidal, whatever rights
[plaintiff] possessed in the land below the mean high water [mark]
were subordinate to the public right of navigation and to the power
of Congress to employ all appropriate means to keep the river open
and its navigation unobstructed."6
The final step in defining the limits of maritime jurisdiction in
70
tidal areas came in Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. Los Angeles,
where the Court adopted a scientific procedure for determining the
MHW-Mark. 7 ' At issue in Borax was the proper boundary between
tidelands as to which California possessed original title upon admittance to the Union, and uplands, which became public lands of
72
the United States at the time of their acquisition from Mexico.
The specific question before the Court was whether this boundary
line was the MHW-Mark or the "neap tide" line.7
After reviewing arguments of an English court which had preserved to the English property owners so much of the land as was
"dry and maniorable"," the Borax Court held that the tidelands
extended to the MHW-Mark as technically defined by the United
States Coastal and Geodetic Survey.75 That survey defined the
MHW-Mark as that boundary line which is determined by the
"average height of all the high waters at a given place over a period
'76
of 18.6 years."
65. Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441, 463 (1847).
66. 240 U.S. 572 (1916).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 579.
69. Id. at 580.
70. 296 U.S. 10 (1935).
I. Id. at 27.
72. Id. at 15-22.
73. Id. at 21-22; "Neap tide" as used in this context refers to the mean low
water mark of the tides.
74. Id. at 22-24.
75. Id. at 26-27.
76. Id.
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It is important to understand, however, that Borax discusses
two basic concepts: the mean high water (MHW) and the mean
high water mark (MHW-Mark). The MHW defined by Borax does
not mean a "physical mark made upon the ground by the waters: it
means the [average horizontal]17 line of high water as determined
by the course of the tides [over an 18.6 year period].

7 8s

To calcu-

late this MHW requires that each day for 18.6 years the "height of
high water above sea level"'79 be recorded and then the arithmetic
mean of the water level can be determined at the end of this 18.6
year period.8 0 Once this MHW height is determined, then the
MHW-Mark can be established. The MHW-Mark is established by
finding the intersection of the land with the water surface at the
elevation of the MHW. 1 It is this MHW-Mark which is the boundary in tidal areas of the navigable waters for the purpose of maritime jurisdiction. 2 In the years following Borax, a case involving a
77. Using the word "horizontal" is not technically correct because of the curvature of the earth and the resulting slight curvature of the waters thereon. For
the purposes of explaining the MHW and MHW-Mark, however, it will be helpful
to visualize a "horizontal" plane on the surface of the water.
78. Borax, 296 U.S. at 22-23.
79. NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, TIDETABLES 1986,
EAST COAST OF NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA INCLUDING GREENLAND (Issued May
1985) (hereinafter NOAA TIDETABLES) 267-68. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is an administrative agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce. A main responsibility for the NOAA is gathering data from
approximately 2000 tide-measuring stations along the Eastern shoreline of North
and South America to calculate tidetables for maritime and other concerns. Water
height data from these stations is collated and used to construct tidetables for the
entire Eastern seaboard of the Atlantic Ocean. In the NOAA TIDETABLES publication, listings for over fifty coastal measuring stations along North Carolina's
shoreline are included, with information provided on tidal height differences, tide
times and mean tide levels for each station. NOAA TIDETABLES at 221.
80. NOAA TIDETABLES at 267-68.
81. Id. at 268. To calculate the MHW-Mark does not require, nor does it
mean, that someone locate over an 18.6 year period the boundary on the shoreline
where the average high tide has reached. If this were the case, something like the
following would be required to get a precise measurement. Assume a 200-foot
stretch of beach from the edge of a sand dune to the edge of the water at low tide.
Everyday for 18.6 years, a statistician would wait and place a marker in the sand
at the point where the tide had reached its peak (high tide). Then, at the end of
the 18.6 year period, he would find the average location of all the stakes and a
mean high tide line could be established. This is not the proper way, however, to
measure the MHW-Mark as dictated in Borax. The proper way is that which is
described supra in notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
82. City of Los Angeles v. Borax Consolidated, Ltd., 74 F.2d 901 (9th Cir.),
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land title-dispute, the terms tide water and navigable water have
become interchangeable to the extent that today the MHW-Mark
is consistently accepted as the boundary in tidal areas of the "navigable waters [and maritime jurisdiction in] the United States." 3
C. Maritime Jurisdiction For Tort Claims
1. Situs
Historically, whether the federal courts could exercise their
maritime jurisdiction in tort claims depended on where the tort
occurred. 4 As early as 1813, the federal courts were holding that
"[i]n regard to torts . . . the jurisdiction of the admiralty is exclusively dependent upon the locality [or situs] of the act; that is,
such as are committed on the high seas, or on waters within the
ebb and flow of the tide. '8 5 But as the definition of navigable waters expanded to include not only tidal waters but those nontidal
waters that were navigable in fact,8 6 the situs for tort jurisdiction
in maritime law also expanded. "Every species of tort, however occurring, and whether on board a vessel or not, if upon the high seas
or navigable waters [was now] of admiralty cognizance", and maritime law governed. 7
This strict situs test worked well in the 1800's, but as the commercial sophistication of the nation developed, the test began
showing its inadequacy. The test suffered from a tendency to create inconsistent results in cases otherwise analogous. For instance,
a longshoreman who was standing on a vessel and was then
knocked onto the wharf had remedies in a federal court applying
maritime law;88 whereas a longshoreman knocked from a wharf
into the water by a sling being lowered from a vessel was denied
remedies under maritime law.8 9 The federal courts and Congress
were regularly being called on to make exceptions to the situs test
"when the tort ha[d] no maritime locality, but [did] bear a relaaff'd, Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935).
83. Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 578 F.2d 742, 750 (9th Cir. 1978).
84. The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 35-36 (1865).
85. Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 253 (1972)
(citing Thomas v. Lane, 23 F. Cas. 957, 960 (CC Me. 1813) (No. 13,902)).
86. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870). See supra notes 5364 and accompanying text.
87. The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 35-36 (1866).
88. Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295 U.S. 647 (1935).
89. T. Smith & Son, Inc. v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179 (1928).
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tionship to maritime service, commerce, or navigation."9 0 These exceptions included injuries to seamen on land, 91 injuries to longshoremen and harbor workers on land, 92 and injuries to persons or
damages to property caused by vessels on navigable waters.9 3 For
some commentators, all this attention to borderline problems was
not the real concern of admiralty. 4 The Supreme Court thought
otherwise, because these borderline situations highlighted some of
the problems with this strict situs test for maritime jurisdiction
over torts.
2.

Nexus

Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland9 5 gave the
Supreme Court an opportunity to redefine the situs test. In Executive Jet, the plaintiff's plane lost power after ingesting seagulls
into its engines while taking off from the defendant's airport, causing the plane to crash and sink in Lake Erie. Plaintiff sued under
section 1333's admiralty provision,9" alleging that defendant was
negligent in failing to keep its runway free of seagulls or to warn of
their presence. 7 Faced with the broader question of whether situs
alone was sufficient to create maritime tort jurisdiction, the Court
pointed out that "reliance on the relationship of the wrong to
traditional maritime activity is often more sensible and more con90. Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 259.
91. See O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36 (1943)
(court sustained the application of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1920), to injuries to a seaman on land, because of the seaman's connection with maritime
commerce).
92. See Gutierrez v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963) (court
allowed the extension of the doctrine of unseaworthiness to cover injuries sustained on land by a seaman or a longshoreman). See also Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq., which was amended
in 1972 to cover employees working on those areas of the shore customarily used
in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel. Pub. L. No. 92-576, § 2, 86
Stat. 1251 (1972).
93. See Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1948),
supra note 13.
94. "The important cases in admiralty are not the borderline cases on jurisdiction .... [T]he main business of the [admiralty] court involves claims for

cargo damage, collision, seamen's injuries and the like-all well and comfortably
within the circle, and far from the penumbra." See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE
LAW

o ADMIRALTY 26 n.88 (2d ed. 1975) (emphasis in original).
95. 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
96. See supra note 12.
97. 409 U.S. at 250-51.
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sonant with the purposes of maritime law than is a purely mechanical application of the [situs] test."9 The Court held that "[ilt is
far more consistent with the history and purpose of admiralty to
require also that the wrong bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity."" After the Executive Jet ruling, the test
to establish maritime jurisdiction for an aviation tort claim required that the situs be within navigable waters, and that the
wrong bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity, or nexus.100
The next step for the Supreme Court would be to extend to all
tort claims the Executive Jet requirements of situs and nexus. In
Kelly v. Smith,'01 the Fifth Circuit, relying on Executive Jet, took
the initiative by holding that any tort claim brought within the
maritime jurisdiction of the federal court must satisfy the situs
and nexus requirements. Kelly v. Smith arose
from a mini ship-to-shore gun battle in the Mississippi River. The
vessel, no ship of the line, [was] a 15-foot outboard boat. The
combatants [were] irregular forces, fleeing deer poachers
afloat[ 1°0 ] and outraged defenders of a private hunting preserve
ashore.[103] The armament, rather than coastal batteries and carronades on the gun deck, consist[ed] of hunting rifles. 04
Finding that the plaintiffs could assert section 1333's admiralty jurisdiction, the court held that Executive Jet's nexus test required
the consideration of four distinct factors. These factors were "[t]he
functions and roles of the parties; the types of vehicles and instrumentalities involved; the causation and the type of injury; and
traditional concepts of the role of admiralty law."' 10 5
The Kelly v. Smith holding is significant because it prompted
the Supreme Court in Foremost Insurance Co. v. Richardson0 6 to
agree that Executive Jet's tort claim criteria of situs and nexus
should apply outside of the context of aviation torts. The end result of this evolution of maritime jurisdiction over tort claims to98. Id. at 261.
99. Id. at 268.
100. Id.
101. 485 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1973).
102. The plaintiffs in Kelly.
103. The defendants in Kelly.
104. Kelly, 485 F.2d at 521.
105. Id. at 525.
106. 457 U.S. 668 (1982). See infra notes 111-16 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Foremost.
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day is that most tort claims, in the absence of legislation to the
contrary, must satisfy both requirements of situs and nexus.
D. Maritime JurisdictionNow Encompasses Pleasure Vessels
When the Constitutional Convention's members were creating
the constitutional and statutory authority for our maritime courts,
their main concern was to protect the country's "domestic shipping
industry. ' 10 7 These members were following the path of governments in other lands which had also created maritime courts to
administer to the "necessities of commerce. 10 8 This "business of
river, lake, and ocean shipping call[ed] for supervision by a tribunal enjoying a particular expertness in regard to the more complicated concerns of that business." 10 9 Today this philosophy, that
the maritime courts function solely to tend to the needs of commercial users and their vessels, is inadequate because our navigable
waters carry more than just commercial vessels. In 1980, sharing
the navigable waters with those commercial vessels were over 10
million pleasure vessels. 110 It was the pleasure vessel operators that
the Supreme Court sought to regulate and protect in Foremost Insurance Company v. Richardson."'
Foremost involved the collision of two pleasure vessels on the
Amite River in Louisiana, which resulted in the death of a passenger named Clyde Richardson."' The wife and children of Richardson brought an action in federal court under section 1333's admiralty provision, claiming that the negligence of the other vessel's
operator caused the collision which resulted in Richardson's death.
At issue on appeal was whether the plaintiffs, in addition to showing situs and nexus, were required to show that the vessel had a
relationship with commercial maritime activity, or status.1 13 The
107. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
108. Foremost, 457 U.S. at 679 (citing 2 T. ET'rING, THE ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION IN AMERICA 7-8 n.2 (1879)) (emphasis in original).
109. Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction:Critique and Suggestions, 50 COLUM. L.
REV. 259, 280 (1950).
110. There were 14.3 million pleasure vessels in the United States in 1980.
U.S. COAST GUARD, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., BOATING STATISTICS-1980 8 (1981).
This author makes the conservative assumption here that approximately twothirds of the pleasure vessels were being operated on the navigable waters of the
United States.
111. 457 U.S. 668 (1982).
112. Id. at 669.
113. Id. at 674.
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Court held that
[a]lthough the primary focus of admiralty jurisdiction is unquestionably the protection of maritime commerce, ... [tihe federal
interest in protecting maritime commerce cannot be adequately
served if admiralty jurisdiction is restricted to those individuals
actually engaged in commercial maritime activity. This interest
can be fully vindicated only if all operators of vessels on navigable waters are subject to uniform rules of conduct. 14
It is not surprising that the Court took this direction, as in
three earlier cases the Court had treated pleasure boats as being
within the maritime jurisdiction without suggesting any doubt
about the matter.11 Considering the increasing number of pleasure
boats crowding our navigable waterways today, undoubtedly "[t]he
potential[ly] disruptive impact of a collision between ... two
pleasure boats on navigable waters [would have] a significant rela'
tionship with maritime commerce." 116
ANALYSIS

A. Reliance on InappropriatePrecedent
The location of the Hassinger sailboat in relation to the
MHW-Mark was of critical importance because in order to invoke
the maritime jurisdiction of the federal court the proper situs and
nexus were required. 11 7 The Fourth Circuit in Hassingerl18 devoted
considerable time to the issue of whether a vessel is required to be
actually in the water to come within the boundary of navigable
water and thereby satisfy the situs requirement for maritime jurisdiction. At the outset the court stated that "[t]he situs requirement is satisfied if the boat or ship is partly in or over the
water."1 19 It supported this statement by citing Blanchard v.
American Commercial Barge Line Co. 120 Whereas the result
reached by the Fourth Circuit-a finding of maritime jurisdiction-was correct, a close reading of Blanchard reveals that it was
an inappropriate precedent for supporting the Hassinger holding.
114.
115.
U.S. 383
116.
117.

Id. at 674-75 (emphasis in original).
See Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648 (1953); Just v. Chambers, 312
(1941); and Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406 (1943).
Foremost, 457 U.S. at 675.
Oman v. Johns-Manville Corp., 764 F.2d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 1985).

118. 781 F.2d 1022 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S.

-,

106 S. Ct. 3294 (1986).

119. Hassinger, 781 F.2d at 1024.
120. 343 F. Supp. 920 (M.D. La. 1972).
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Blanchard involved a claim for personal injuries and property
damage to a plaintiff and his fourteen-foot aluminum boat caused
when a tug and its tow of three barges ran aground near the Intracoastal Canal in Louisiana. The plaintiff had been searching in
a canal that parallelled the Intracoastal Canal for logs with which
to build a pier for himself. 2 1 After finding a suitable log, the plaintiff "beached his boat and proceeded to cut the log."'1 22 It was
while cutting this log that "[t]he lead barge went about 100 to 150
23
feet up on the bank, and in doing so struck plaintiffs boat,'
damaging the boat and causing injury to the plaintiff.
When this accident occurred, however, the Blanchard court
gave no indication as to whether (a) the boat was partly in the
water, (b) the boat was out of the water but below the MHWMark, (c) part of the boat was below the MHW-Mark and the
other part above it, or (d) the entire boat was above the MHWMark and on dry ground. Much of the discussion in Blanchard
centers on plaintiff's pain and suffering as being caused by a preexisting back injury,12 4 and not on the issue of situs for maritime
jurisdiction. The court in Blanchard failed to give any legal analysis or precedent for its finding of maritime jurisdiction pursuant to
section 1333's admiralty provision, or its finding of maritime jurisdiction pursuant to the Admiralty Jurisdiction Extension Act. 125
Because the Admiralty Jurisdiction Extension Act covers those injuries on land "caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding that such . . .injury be . . . consummated on land, ' ' 126
the logical conclusion of the court's opinion would be that plaintiff
was completely above the MHW-Mark at the time of the accident.
When the electrocutions in Hassinger occurred as the three
men were attempting to beach Hassinger's sailboat, the evidence
cited by the court supported the finding that the sailboat was below the MHW-Mark at the time of the accident. 1 7 Despite the fact
121. Id. at 921.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 922.
125. Id. at 923; see also supra note 13 for pertinent portions of the Act.
126. See supra note 13.
127. The court noted that evidence stating that the sailboat was at least partially in the water when the accident occurred was confirmed by at least sixteen
witnesses; whereas, evidence stating that the sailboat was not in the water, but on
dry ground, was confirmed by at least four witnesses. Hassinger,781 F.2d at 102425.
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that the sailboat may not have been completely in the water when
the mast contacted the power line, because the boat was below the
MHW-Mark, the situs required for maritime jurisdiction was satisfied.' 2s This basic principle of maritime jurisdiction stated by the
Hassinger court, standing alone, was sufficient for the finding of
situs. The Blanchard opinion does not support this holding
reached by the Hassinger court in its decision, and therefore was
inappropriately cited by the court.
B. Common Sense and Nonsense Stand Face to Face in the
Fourth Circuit
Another peculiar aspect of the decision in Hassinger arises
when comparing that decision with the holding in Hastings v.
Mann,'2 9 an earlier Fourth Circuit decision. The Hassinger court
cited Hastings as support for finding the necessary situs of the decedents, stating that "[w]hether, at the time the injury was sustained, [libellant] . . . was landward or seaward of the actual edge
of the water, his rights should be the same, and they should be
1 30
determinable in the same court."
In Hastings, the plaintiff fell and was injured in the waters of
Pamlico Sound, North Carolina while launching his vessel from a
boat launching ramp.' 3 ' The boat ramp itself extended from "a
point some distance above high water to a point well below low
water. No portion of it was afloat, for the underwater portion of
the launching ramp was securely fastened to the bottom." 132 Following the accident, plaintiff asserted against the marina owner a
claim in federal court pursuant to section 1333's admiralty provision. 3 3 Despite the fact that plaintiff was standing in the water
when the accident occurred, the court refused to recognize plaintiff's claim as within maritime jurisdiction. The court held that the
34
boat ramp, like a pier or a wharf, was an extension of the land,1
128. Id. at 1025, 1027.
129. 340 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1965).
130. Hassinger, 781 F.2d at 1026-27 (citing Hastings, 340 F.2d at 912).
131. The phrase 'boat launching ramp' will hereinafter be referred to simply
as 'boat ramp'.
132. Hastings, 340 F.2d at 911.
133. Id.

134. Id. at 912. The extension of the land doctrine, as cited in Hastings, prevents recovery within the federal courts' maritime jurisdiction for damages to
piers, wharfs and similar structures extending over navigable waters, and prevents
recovery for injuries suffered by persons while upon such structures unless caused
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and therefore any injury occurring on the boat ramp was not
1 35
within maritime jurisdiction.
The Hastings court, using for support what it considered as
"the most closely analogous case", 3' relied on an 1885 case entitled The Professor Morse137 to reach the conclusion that the boat
ramp was an extension of the land. The Professor Morse, however,
involved an in rem' 3 8 action by the owner of a marine railway for
damages caused to the railway itself, which extended 700 feet into
the waters of New York harbor. The crew of the Professor Morse
(a steamship) had run a mooring line from the steamship to a buoy
in the harbor channel. The buoy itself was attached to an anchor
which held the buoy in its proper location. As the steamship
drifted that evening from its mooring, the buoy's anchor dragged
across the railway and caused the railway extensive damage. 3 9 The
Professor Morse court held that because the railway could not be
considered "a craft or vessel intended to float on the water . . . ,
[t]he upper [and lower] end[s] . . . [being] securely fastened to the
land", the "offense was committed and consummated" on the land
10
and maritime jurisdiction would not apply. 4
The district court in Hastings took this reasoning and used it
to hold that a boat ramp, being constructed of "creosoted lumber
lying [firmly attached] on the ground of the [marina owner's]
property", 14 1 was an extension of the land, and any accidents or
injuries occurring thereon were not cognizable in maritime jurisdiction. The court created a fiction which holds that injuries that occur while on a boat ramp, even if the injury occurs while the person is physically in the water, will be considered to have occurred
on land.14 If the injury to the person on the boat ramp was caused
by a vessel on navigable waters, however, the injured person can
assert maritime jurisdiction under the Admiralty Jurisdiction Exby a vessel on navigable waters. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. 23 F. 803 (D.C.N.J. 1885).
138. In rem is a "technical term used to designate proceedings or actions instituted against the thing, in contradistinction to personal actions, which are said
to be in personam." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 713 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis in
original).
139. 23 F. at 806.
140. Id. at 804, 806.
141. Hastings v. Mann, 226 F. Supp. 962, 963 (E.D.N.C. 1964), aff'd., 340
F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1965).
142. Hastings, 340 F.2d at 912.
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tension Act."4 3
If Hastings is still good law in the Fourth Circuit after the
Hassingerdecision, then applying the situs and nexus tests for satisfying maritime jurisdiction to someone who is injured while
launching a vessel' 4 4 at a boat ramp could create anomalous jurisdictional findings. In Hastings, the plaintiff on the boat ramp was
actually in the water, but was precluded from asserting maritime
jurisdiction because situs was lacking.' 4 5 In Hassinger, however,
the three decedents beaching the Hobie Cat sailboat could have
been completely out of the water, and still have asserted maritime
jurisdiction because they were below the MHW-Mark.'" The following hypothetical illustrates a problem associated with having
both Hassinger and Hastings co-existing as controlling law in the
Fourth Circuit.
C. Beaching and Launching a Vessel as Within Maritime Jurisdiction
1. Hypothetical A
Assume that at the exact location where the decedents in
Hassingerwere beaching their Hobie Cat sailboat, there was a boat
ramp exactly like the one in Hastings. Assume a situation similar
to that actually occurring in Hassinger-the three decedents decide to use the boat ramp for pulling the sailboat out of the water.
Assume also that it is low tide and the sailboat is on the ramp and
completely out of the water, though seaward of the MHW-Mark.
Following the holding in Hastings, when the sailboat's mast contacts the power line and the three men are electrocuted, their administrators would be unable to assert maritime jurisdiction because the injury occurred on "an extension of the land. ' '"1 7 The
decedents' rights would be the same as those of an individual
"upon a pier, who, when injured, is well seaward of both high and
low water.""148 But remove the boat ramp from the hypothetical
and you have the holding in Hassinger, where the administrators
143. Id.
144. The following analysis in the text would be applicable to launching a
vessel from a boat ramp into navigable water, and also to hauling out that same
vessel from the water by using the convenience of a boat ramp.
145. Hastings, 340 F.2d at 911.
146. Hassinger, 781 F.2d at 1025.
147. Hastings, 340 F.2d at 912.
148. Id.
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2. Why Launching a Vessel Should Satisfy the Nexus for
Maritime Jurisdiction
Despite reluctance by some jurists and commentators to accept that pleasure vessels should be included within the maritime
jurisdiction of the federal courts, 50 the Foremost decision created
the foundation for allowing them to be included if the proper situs
and nexus requirements were satisfied.' 5 ' The Hassinger decision
now supplies the element of jurisdiction necessary for those situations in which a pleasure vessel is hauled out of the water (i.e.
beaching a vessel). The Hassinger court quoted the district court
by saying that " '[tihe role of the decedents at the time of the accident was that of a sailor attempting to remove a vessel from navigation; . . . [such] activity . . . [is] considered as having a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity within the

meaning of Executive Jet.' ",152

The logical conclusion derived from this statement is the following: if maritime jurisdiction is present when pulling a vessel out
of the water, assuming the situs requirement is met, then maritime
jurisdiction should be present when launching a vessel into the
water, again assuming the situs requirement is met. For many people in earlier eras of our civilization, whose vocation and livelihood
came from fishing the oceans and seas in small vessels, it was necessary after a day's work to pull their vessels up onto the beach
and beyond the reach of the tides. This "beaching of a vessel" was
done by muscling the boat up along the beach as far as possible.
"This act [was] an ancient and practical solution to the problem of
removing the [vessel] from the reach of the tides.' 1 53 And when the
next day dawned and another day of fishing was at hand, launching the vessel was accomplished by muscling the boat down along
the beach and back into the water. Such was true in days long
149. Hassinger, 781 F.2d 1022.

150. See Foremost Insurance Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 677 (1982)
(Powell, J., dissenting), see also Swaim, Yes, Virginia, There is an Admiralty:
The Rodrique Case, 16 LOYOLA L. REV. 43 (1970) ("Maritime commerce-and
nothing more-is the raison d'etre for the courts and rules of admiralty". Id. at
44.)
151. See supra notes 107-16 and accompanying text.

152. Hassinger, 781 F.2d at 1027 (quoting Hassinger, 627 F. Supp. at 71-72).
153. Hassinger, 627 F. Supp. at 71.
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past, and remains true even today for some fishermen. Applying
the four-prong test for nexus under Kelly v. Smith and Hassinger
to pleasure vessels, this launching of a vessel should satisfy the elements required for nexus in the same manner as beaching that
same vessel.15 '
As applied to the Hassingerholding, it should follow that had
the three men been pulling the Hobie Cat down towards the water
during the low tide, and the sailboat's mast had then struck the
power line which extended over an area seaward of the MHWMark, maritime jurisdiction would have been present. The main
question regarding the Hastings decision in light of the holdings in
Executive Jet, Foremost and Hassinger,is why the criteria of satisfying maritime jurisdiction while launching a pleasure vessel
should be any different because an owner launches his vessel by
using a boat ramp. For those thousands of North Carolinians who
annually enjoy the convenience of launching their pleasure vessels
at boat ramps located along North Carolina's twenty-five coastal
counties, 55 the Hastings holding creates unnecessary jurisdictional
problems.
To illustrate the problems caused by continuing to rely on the
Hastings decision, consider the routine that many pleasure vessel
owners follow when launching their vessels at a boat ramp. The
vessel is pulled on land by a boat trailer, which in turn is transported along the highway by an automobile. The trailer itself has a
winch, located on the front of the trailer, that contains a rope or
steel cable that is usually connected to a large eyelet on the bow of
the vessel. Connecting this cable to the vessel, and removing the
slack, keeps the vessel properly pulled up onto the trailer. Three or
four canvas straps are wrapped around the vessel to keep it firmly
secured to the trailer while it is transported along the highway, or
154. Under this four-prong text stated by the Kelly v. Smith court (see supra
notes 101-05 and accompanying text), the role of the boaters would be that of
pleasure boating enthusiasts attempting to launch a vessel into navigable waters;
the types of vehicles and instrumentalities involved would be pleasure vessels and
their accompanying equipment and rigging; the causation and type of injuries (see
infra note 159 for examples of accidents that could possibly occur) would probably center around negligence and products liability accidents; the traditional concepts of the role of admiralty would be those that involve all boating concerns,
commercial and pleasure-that of physically placing the vessel into the water.
155. These counties are Beaufort, Bertie, Bladen, Brunswick, Camden, Carteret, Chowan, Columbus, Craven, Currituck, Dare, Gates, Halifax, Hertford,
Hyde, Martin, New Hanover, Northampton, Onslow, Pamlico, Pasquotank,
Pender, Perquimans, Tyrrell, and Washington.
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while the trailer is being backed onto the boat ramp. In actually
launching the vessel, the trailer, with vessel attached, is backed
down onto the boat ramp and into the water. Oftentimes, the incline of the boat ramp is steeper than the natural slope of the
shore. This allows the trailer to become partially submerged in the
water more quickly than if the boat ramp followed the natural
slope of the shore. While the trailer is being backed into the water,
a member of the boating party is usually ankle-deep to waist-deep
in the water to assist in launching the vessel. Oftentimes, another
member of the boating party will be in the vessel, manning the
controls to maneuver the vessel outside of the launching area once
it is released from the trailer. If the canvas straps have not yet
been released from the vessel, they are now released by the person
standing in the water. The tension of the trailer's winch cable is
then released, and the vessel is now afloat on the water, though it
remains attached to the winch cable and, possibly, the canvas
straps.
The problem created by Hastings lies in deciding when the
vessel is in the water for the purpose of satisfying situs. For instance, in the above scenario of launching the vessel, Hastings says
that when the person on the boat ramp is waist-deep in water releasing the canvas strapping, or is ankle-deep in water releasing
the tauntness of the trailer's winch cable, he is technically on dry
land for situs purposes.1 58 Likewise the trailer carrying the vessel,
even when the trailer is partially submerged, is technically on dry
land for situs purposes. But when is the vessel itself considered as
being "on navigable waters",1 57 thereby satisfying the situs requirement for maritime jurisdiction, and when, under the Hastings ruling, is the vessel still considered to be technically on land, despite
being actually in the water? Does the vessel have to be completely
free of the restraints of the trailer to be "on navigable waters", or
would being partially free of the trailer meet the requirement for
being "on navigable waters" for situs purposes? The Hastings decision fails to answer either of these questions. If being completely
free of the trailer is the test for finding situs under Hastings and
Hassinger, consider the following hypotheticals.
156. Hastings, 340 F.2d at 912.

157. See supra notes 47-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of navigable waters in the context of maritime jurisdiction.
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol9/iss1/7
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Hypothetical B

Assume that a boating enthusiast meets the four-prong test
for nexus under Kelly v. Smith and Hassinger when launching his
6
vessel on a boat ramp.5'
He is standing in the water on the boat
ramp below the MHW-Mark, is releasing the canvas strapping and
is slackening the trailer's winch cable. A friend is on board the vessel manning the controls when an accident occurs that injures one
1 59
or both of the men.
If having the vessel completely free of the trailer is the test for
finding situs, then the two injured boaters in the above hypothetical would be precluded from asserting maritime jurisdiction under
section 1333's admiralty provision, or under the Admiralty Jurisdiction Extension Act. The reason is that both the man in the
water and the vessel, which is in the water being launched, are
considered under the Hastings ruling to be on an extension of the
land where maritime jurisdiction does not apply. The boaters' only
chance for asserting maritime tort jurisdiction would be if another
vessel on navigable waters injured them, in which case the Admiralty Jurisdiction Extension Act would supply the jurisdiction.' °
In effect, if the extension of the land doctrine precludes their
bringing a maritime action, the rights and liabilities of the two
men are the same as if the accident had taken place in their backy158. See supra note 154.
159. In deciding what type of accident occurs, the reader can apply to this
situation any of the following scenarios which have actually resulted in state and
federal civil lawsuits, and which could have occured while launching the vessel:
Degen v. Bayman, 241 N.W.2d 703 (S.D. 1976), where the design of the motorboat
permitted the 210-horsepower motor to be started while the transmission was in
gear and the throttle open, which resulted in injury to the plaintiff; Schedlbauer
v. Chris-Craft Corp., 381 Mich. 217, 160 N.W.2d 889 (1968), where the design of
the fuel pump's diaphragm resulted in the engine's explosion, (the continual wear
on the diaphragm resulted in discharge of gasoline into the engine compartment);
McKee v. Brunswick Corp., 354 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1965), where a defective coil
created a short circuit that melted the insulation off an ignition wire, which ignition wire then contacted a battery wire and caused a serious explosion; Peltier v.
Seabird Industries, Inc., 304 So. 2d 695 (La. Ct. App. 1974), writ denied, 309 So.
2d 343 (La. 1975), where the fittings on copper-tubing gaslines, installed according to the manufacturer's instructions ("finger tight"), created fuel leaks which
led to a fire when a spark ignited the fumes, destroying the vessel and injuring the
owner; or Kale v. Daugherty, 8 N.C. App. 417, 174 S.E.2d 846 (1970), where a 110
horsepower motor exploded then the operator attempted to start the engine without first ventilating the engine compartment.
160. See supra notes 13 and 93 and accompanying text.
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ards, miles away from any beach or watercourse.
4. Hypothetical C
Now assume the exact situation in Hypothetical B, except that
the two men are not launching their vessel on a boat ramp. Rather,
they have decided that the shore is firm enough to allow them to
back the trailer into the water without having to use a boat ramp.
Hastings' extension of the land doctrine now has no application.
The man in the water slackening the trailer's winch cable has satisfied situs, and the vessel, floating in the water, has also satisfied
situs. With both situs and nexus now present, 1" after the accident
occurs both men could assert claims within maritime jurisdiction
under section 1333's admiralty provision, or under section 1332's
diversity provision."6 2 Maritime law would also now apply. This application of maritime law would bring with it the possibility of applying strict liability in any products liability action,' 6" comparative negligence,'1 and a possible limitation of liability under the
Limited Liability Act of 1851.165
161. As stated supra in note 154 and accompanying text, it is assumed in
these hypotheticals that nexus for maritime jurisdiction would be present when
launching a pleasure vessel into navigable waters.
162. Section 1332's diversity provision could be asserted if diversity of citizenship and the minimum $10,000 amount in controversy were present. See supra
note 15.
163. See East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., - U.S. _,
106 S. Ct. 2295 (1986). In an action by charterers of four supertankers against the
turbine manufacturer for alleged design and performance defects, the Court held
that "a manufacturer in a commercial relationship has no duty under either a
negligence or strict products-liability theory to prevent a product from injuring
itself." Id. at 2302. In reaching this decision, the Court stated that "[w]e join the
Courts of Appeals in recognizing products liability, including strict liability, as
part of the general maritime law." Id. at 2299. See also Tisdale v. Teleflex, Inc.,
612 F. Supp. 30 (D.S.C. 1985) (court held that admiralty law recognizes the doctrine of strict liability as enunciated in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A
(1965)).
164. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
165. 8 Stat. 635 (1851) (current version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-82, 183(a), 184-88
(1970)). This Act allows the owner of any vessel to limit his liability for damage
claims arising out of the operation or use of his vessel on navigable waters of the
United States to the post-accident value of the vessel, if the alleged damages occurred without the "privity or knowledge" of the vessel owner. 46 U.S.C. § 183(a)
(1970). The pleasure vessel owner may often escape vicarious liability where he
has delegated the maintenance, use, or operation of his craft to an agent whose
negligence caused the accident. This limitation of liability under the Act has been
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol9/iss1/7
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Contrary to this, however, if the Hastings' ruling were applied
in the above Hypothetical B, situs would not be present for maritime jurisdiction and North Carolina law would control. If the parties brought products liability suits the North Carolina General
Statutes Chapter 99B, 66 which has not been interpreted as ordinarily authorizing strict liability, now would apply.16 7 Contributory
negligence, if present, would also apply and possibly bar any recovery for the party bringing the action. 6 8 Finally, the possible limitation of liability available to a defendant under maritime jurisdiction would be unavailable. 6 9
CONCLUSION

The probability of civil actions being brought for accidents occurring on boat ramps is not based on the same uncertainty that is
present when calculating the chances of another Hassinger-type
accident happening. Hopefully, the power utilities in North Carolina have realized the threat to public safety of placing uninsulated
overhead powerlines close to navigable watercourses. The likelihood of seeing accidents occur at public and private boat launching
ramps, however, is not nearly as remote as the likelihood of a
Hassinger-type accident. Each year, during the warm weather
months especially, thousands of boating enthusiasts in North Carolina take advantage of the convenience of using boat ramps to
successfully asserted in damage suits for explosions and collisions and against
claims of injury and wrongful death made by passengers and employees. See Gibboney v. Wright, 517 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1975). See also Note, Pleasure-Boating
and the Admiralty Jurisdiction, 10 STAN. L. REV. 724, 734 nn.82-85 (1958). See
also G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 846 n.45 (2d ed. 1975).
166. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-1 et seq. (1979).
167. See McCollum v. Grove Manufacturing Co., 58 N.C. App. 283, 293
S.E.2d 632 (1982), aff'd, 307 N.C. 695, 300 S.E.2d 374 (1983).
168. North Carolina courts, from as early as Turrentine v. The Richmond &
Danville R.R. Co., 92 N.C. 638 (1885), to as recently as Smith v. Fiber Controls
Corp., 300 N.C. 669, 268 S.E.2d 504 (1980), have recognized the doctrine of contributory negligence.
169. If the test for situs is being partially free of the trailer, then maritime
jurisdiction would be available to both parties in Hypothetical B, regardless of
whether the boat ramp was used to launch the vessel. For the accident which
occurs on the boat ramp in Hypothetical B, the Admiralty Jurisdiction Extension
Act would supply the necessary jurisdiction. For the accident which occurs when
the boaters had backed the trailer into the water without using the boat ramp,
then maritime jurisdiction would be present using the same analysis as used in
Hypothetical C.
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launch their small- and medium-sized vessels. Though no one intends to be involved in any accident while launching their vessel,
or while cruising in the water for that matter, the statistics forecast
that accidents are likely to happen.
In 1985 alone, the U.S. Coast Guard received reports nationwide on 6,237 pleasure vessel accidents which occurred on our nation's watercourses that resulted in 1.116 fatalities, 170 2,757 injuries 17 and over $20,000,000 worth of property damage. 7 2 And if
the number of accounted-for accidents seems large, note that the
Coast Guard estimates that it only receives reports annually on
five to ten percent of all reportable accidents not involving fatalities.' 73 This means that the statistic of 6,237 pleasure vessel accidents reported is a very conservative figure for the number of accidents actually occurring each year. With these large figures, both
in the number of North Carolinians who use boat ramps and the
number of accidents and their resulting hardships that occur each
year on the nation's watercourses, the probability for serious accidents occurring on North Carolina's boat ramps is substantial.
The Hassinger decision is a common sense refusal to decide
the issue of situs in maritime jurisdiction on the "fortuitous state
of the tide'' 1 when an accident occurs. The Hastings decision,
however, holds that the issue of situs in maritime jurisdiction does
depend on the fortuitous location of the injured plaintiff who is
launching or beaching his vessel. Though the Fourth Circuit has
1 75
questioned the soundness of Hastings at least once in the past, if
Hastings today can co-exist peacefully with Hassinger in the
Fourth Circuit, there is a strong message to North Carolina's weekend sailing and power-boating enthusiasts: despite the convenience, using a boat ramp to launch or beach your vessels could
seriously affect your rights and liabilities should an accident occur
while you are on the boat ramp.
Paul A. Newton

170.
(1985).
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
1973).

U.S. COAST GUARD, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., BOATING STATISTICS-1985 14

Id. at 17.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 16-19.
Hassinger, 627 F. Supp. at 71.
See Onley v. South Carolina Electric & Gas Co., 488 F.2d 758 (4th Cir.
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